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SCHOOLS—DISTRICT LIABILITY:
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION LIABILITY AND SCHOOL DUTIES
PREVAIL OVER RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY
M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1,
2010 ND 102, 783 N.W.2d 806
ABSTRACT
In M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statutes
were not applicable when a student was injured on school grounds during
school hours. Thus, a school district, as a political subdivision, can be liable for a student’s injuries pursuant to section 32-12.1-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code. Recreational use immunity statutes, or some variation of the statutes, can be found in all states and are in place to encourage
landowners to open their property for recreational purposes without facing
the risks of liability. While landowners do not have a duty to warn or keep
the premises safe for recreational users, a willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity may
still result in liability. Since North Dakota’s enactment of the recreational
use immunity statutes in 1965, the statutes have endured several modifications and judicial interpretations, including their applicability to political
subdivisions. However, through consideration of the purpose of the recreational use immunity statutes, the location of the accident, other laws pertaining to the special relationship between schools and students, and the
analysis provided by other courts, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined to immunize the school district under these statutes when M.M., a
student, injured himself while performing a bike stunt in the school
auditorium shortly after classes adjourned. By narrowing the use of the
recreational use immunity statutes, more liability may result from the M.M.
decision as contrary to the legislature’s policy decision behind enacting the
statutes.
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FACTS

In 2004, M.M. was a ninth grade student attending Discovery Middle
School in Fargo, North Dakota.1 As a part of the curriculum taught by U.S.
History teacher Eugenia Hart, students could participate in the annual event
called “60s Day,” which consisted of various activities.2 One year, a
student performed a bike stunt for the event in the school’s auditorium.3
M.M.’s classmate, J.B., learned of the student’s stunt and approached M.M.
about recreating the stunt for the 2004 “60s Day.”4 When J.B. asked Hart
about the stunt, J.B. allegedly did not receive an affirmative “yes” or “no”
answer until Hart later approached M.M. and told M.M. it was “not a good
idea.”5
The day before the event, J.B. and M.M. decided to practice the stunt in
the school’s auditorium.6 Without formal permission to do so, and despite
Hart’s conversation with M.M., M.M. and J.B. brought their bikes into the
auditorium in order to practice; the two entered through a side door left ajar,
between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.7 At the school, classes adjourned at 3:30
p.m., but teachers and administrators typically stayed until 4:00 p.m.8 On
this particular day, Hart left the school at approximately 3:30 p.m.9
When practicing, J.B. successfully completed his stunt.10 When M.M.
attempted the stunt, however, he fell and hit his head on the auditorium
floor.11 As a result of the fall, M.M. sustained serious injuries.12
M.M. and his father, Thomas Moore, brought suit against Hart and
Fargo Public School District No. 1 (the District) in 2007 for Hart’s negligent actions during the course of her employment.13 The District moved for
summary judgment before trial, which was granted on the ground that the
recreational use immunity statutes from chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code shielded the school from liability for accidents occurring on

1. M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶ 2, 783 N.W.2d 806, 808.
2. Id. at 809.
3. Id. ¶ 3.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
6. Id. ¶ 4.
7. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
8. Id. ¶ 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. ¶ 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. ¶ 6. A separate claim was brought against Hart for personal liability. Id.
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school property.14 The trial court also found the “willful and malicious”
exception to the recreational use immunity statute did not apply based on
the evidence presented.15 M.M. and Thomas Moore appealed the decision,
arguing the district court erred in ruling recreational use immunity shielded
the District from liability.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
All fifty states have some form of recreational use immunity statutes in
place to protect landowners from injuries stemming from recreational use of
their land when it is open for such use.17 Many of these statutes are similar
to model legislation promulgated by the Council of State Governments
called “Public recreation on private lands: limitations on liability.”18 North
Dakota followed the example legislation and passed chapter 53-08 of the
North Dakota Century Code, entitled “Limiting Liability of Landowners,”

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 783 N.W.2d at 810.
Id. ¶ 14, 783 N.W.2d at 812; see MATTHEW BENDER, PREMISES LIABILITY—LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5.01 (2010); see also ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-1 to -28 (2009); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.65.200 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to 307 (2009); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (Deering 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to -106
(2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-557f to -557i (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-5907
(2010); FLA. STAT. § 375.251 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2009); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 520-1 to -8 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1604 (2009); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 65/165/7 (2008); IND. CODE § 14-22-10-2 (2003); IOWA CODE §§ 461C.1-461C.7 (2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2795 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 159-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES.
§§ 5-1101 to -1108 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 17C (2009); MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 324.73301 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 604A.20-.27 (2010); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -27 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 537.345-537.347 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 70-16-301 to -302 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729 to -736 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.510 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42A-2 to -5.1 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (2006); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9103 (Consol. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to -4 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18 to -181 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76,
§ 10.1 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682 (2009); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 477-1 to -7
(West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -6 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to -70 (2007);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-12 to -18 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-10-101 to -104 (1999);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001-75.003 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-141 to -7 (LexisNexis 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5791-5795 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 29130.2 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.200-.210 (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to
-6 (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-19-101 to
-107 (2009).
18. Cf. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner’s Liability for
Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R.4th 262, 270 (2010).
14.
15.
16.
17.
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in 1965.19 However, since 1965, the statutes have undergone several legislative modifications in response to judicial rulings.20
A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY STATUTES
The express purpose of many recreational use immunity statutes is “to
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the
public for recreational purposes.”21 The statutes arose due to judicial expansion of those who constitute an “invitee”22 on land for purposes of
owing a duty of care, thereby immunizing landowners against claims concerning maintenance and operation of property offered for free, recreational
purposes.23 While recreational use immunity statutes may differ from stateto-state, many of these statutes follow partially or entirely the suggested
legislation offered by the Council of State Governments.24
Overall, the suggested legislation provides that a landowner whose land
is being used for recreational purposes, without charge, owes no duty either
to provide care to keep the property safe for entry or use or to give any
warning of “a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” on the property.25 Additionally, the legislation states a landowner neither extends any
assurances the property is safe for a recreational user nor confers on a recreational user the legal status of an invitee26 or licensee,27 which would
impose a duty of care on a landowner.28 Yet, any “willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” may result in a landowner’s liability.29 Therefore, the main question
19. See 1965 N.D. Laws 648-50. Today, the chapter is known as “Liability Limited for
Owner of Recreation Lands.” N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08.
20. Compare, e.g., Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶ 13, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388
(noting that recreational use immunity statutes, as enacted in 1965, were applicable only to private
landowners), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(2) (“‘Land’ includes all public and private
lands . . . .”).
21. BENDER, supra note 17, § 5.01; see also 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150 (The
Council of State Governments, 1965).
22. An “invitee,” particularly a “public invitee,” is defined as “a person who is invited to
enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to
the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
23. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.05.42 (3d ed.
2003).
24. Miller, supra note 18, at 270.
25. Id. at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 151; see, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-02 to -03.
26. See supra note 22.
27. A “licensee” is defined as “a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by
virtue of the possessor’s consent.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 22, § 330.
28. Miller, supra note 18, at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at
151; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-03 to -04.
29. Miller, supra note 18, at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at
151; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05.

694

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:689

that arises in many suits pertaining to recreational use and personal injuries
is whether the statutes are applicable and, if they are not, which common
law principles will determine the landowner’s liability.30
B. STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY
STATUTES IN NORTH DAKOTA
With the enactment of the recreational use immunity statutes in chapter
53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, the North Dakota Legislature
mirrored the purpose stated by the Council of State Governments and
explicitly wanted “to encourage landowners to open their land to the public
for recreational purposes” by limiting landowners’ liability toward users.31
However, faced with judicial decisions expanding potential liability and
limiting the application of these statutes after their enactment,32 the
legislature was forced to change the language of some sections in chapter
53-08 to broaden the statutes’ applicability.33
1.

Enactment and Original Purpose in 1965

Following the lead of many states and the Council of State
Governments’ suggested legislation, North Dakota introduced and passed
the recreational use immunity statutes in 1965.34 These statutes provided so
long as the owner of land did not perform willful or malicious acts against
recreational users and did not charge the person injured for recreational use
of the land, he or she owed no duty of care to keep the premises safe for
recreational purposes, or to give any warning to those individuals on the
premises of potentially dangerous conditions.35 Also, by using the land for
recreational purposes, the user did not have any assurances the land is safe,
that he or she has the legal status of an invitee or licensee, or that the owner
assumed any responsibility for injuries.36 Initially, the term “recreational
purpose” was defined by including examples of recreational activities.37
“Land” also included an exhaustive list of “roads, water, watercourses,
30. Miller, supra note 18, at 271.
31. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶ 10, 563 N.W.2d 384, 387.
32. See id.; see also Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D.
1987) (citing Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D. 1974)).
33. See Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508-09.
34. Cf. 1965 N.D. Laws 648-50.
35. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-02, -05 (2007).
36. Id. §§ 53-08-03 to -04.
37. See Stokka v. Cass Cnty. Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 913 (N.D. 1985) (“‘Recreational
purposes’ includes, but is not limited to, any one or any combination of the following: hunting,
fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water
skiing, winter sports, and visiting, viewing, or enjoying historical, archaeological, geological,
scenic, or scientific sites, or otherwise using land for purposes of the user.”).
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private ways and buildings, structures and machinery or equipment thereon
when attached to the realty.”38
The statutes remained unchallenged until the 1985 case of Stokka v.
Cass County Electric Cooperative.39 While the main argument in the case
was whether Stokka’s snowmobiling accident occurred in a location within
the definition of “land,” as defined in section 53-08-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code, Stokka made a public policy argument toward expanding
tort liability in order to disallow the statutes’ applicability in his case.40 The
court rejected the argument as beyond the duty of the judiciary and more
appropriate for the North Dakota Legislature.41 Rather, the court noted its
task was to interpret the current recreational use statutes, which led the
court to conclude the public highways Stokka used when his snowmobiling
accident occurred fell within the bounds of the statutes.42 As a result, the
statutes shielded the landowner from liability unless the landowner’s
actions were willful or malicious.43
2.

Application in Response to Governmental Liability

After the abolishment of governmental immunity for political subdivisions, the North Dakota Legislature passed chapter 32-12.1, relating to
political subdivision liability.44 The recreational use immunity statutes
were questioned in relation to a new subsection in chapter 32-12.1, subsection 32-12.1-03(1), in Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource
District.45 In that case, Fastow dove into a designated swimming area
regulated by the Water District and injured his spinal cord.46 Because the
Water District was a political subdivision and the activities Fastow engaged

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 914.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 915.
43. Id.
44. Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D. 1987) (citing
Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D. 1974)). In particular, subsection 32-12.103(1) provides:
Each political subdivision shall be liable for money damages for injuries when the
injuries are proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any
employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment or office under circumstances where the employee would be personally liable to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state, or injury caused from some condition or use of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where the political subdivision, if
a private person, would be liable to the claimant.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (2010).
45. 415 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1987).
46. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507.
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in were recreational, an issue on appeal was whether the more recently
passed chapter 32-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code required the
application of the recreational use immunity statutes to political
subdivisions.47
The trial court determined subsection 32-12.1-03(1) provided two
instances for a political subdivision to be held liable for injuries, and the
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed.48 One instance of political subdivision liability arises when the injury occurred due to a condition or use of
the property and a private person could be liable under the same circumstances.49 Another instance of liability may arise for “injuries caused by the
negligence or wrongful act or omission of an employee acting within the
scope of the employee’s employment [for the political subdivision].”50
Although political subdivision liability exists under these circumstances, the
court stated when injuries are sustained by a nonpaying recreational user
such as Fastow, chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code precludes
liability for acts of ordinary negligence or property conditions.51
The issue addressed in Fastow was revisited in Hovland v. City of
Grand Forks.52 There, Hovland was injured while in-line skating on a
municipal bike path and sued the City of Grand Forks (City) for
negligence.53 The lower court granted the City’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the recreational use immunity statute applied to
political subdivisions.54 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed,
holding the discussion announced in Fastow—regarding political
subdivision liability in relation to recreational use—to be dicta because the
essential holding of Fastow was that the political subdivision waived its
immunity by purchasing insurance coverage.55 Therefore, because the
application of the recreational use immunity statutes to political
subdivisions would circumvent the legislative intent behind political
subdivision liability in chapter 32-12.1, and because the recreational use
immunity statutes were created to encourage private landowners to open
lands for public access, the court determined the City was not immune.56
47. Id.
48. Id. at 509.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. When a political subdivision has insurance coverage, however, chapter 53-08 does
not apply for immunity. Id.
52. 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384.
53. Hovland, ¶¶ 2-3, 563 N.W.2d at 385-86.
54. Id. ¶ 4, 563 N.W.2d at 386.
55. Id. ¶ 8, 563 N.W.2d at 386-87.
56. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 563 N.W.2d at 387-88 (emphasis added).
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Legislative Amendments to Recreational Use
Immunity Statutes

The North Dakota Legislature recognized the need to alter the recreational use immunity statutes to withstand further judicial scrutiny.57 Thus,
the legislature first amended the statutes by changing the language “willful
or malicious” in subsection 53-08-05(1) to “willful and malicious.”58 In
1995, the statutes were again amended to change the definitions of “land”
and “recreational purposes.”59 The new definitions provided “land”
included “all public and private land . . .” and “recreational purpose” was
“any activity engaged in for the purpose of exercise, relaxation, pleasure, or
education.”60 The legislative intent behind changing these definitions was
to protect landowners, regardless of whether the land was public or private,
as well as to expand the types of activities that were recreational to protect
against the exposure of liability.61
C. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY
The North Dakota cases dealing with recreational use immunity can be
categorized into two separate time frames according to the legislative
changes explained above: pre- and post-1995 amendments to chapter 5308. Although political subdivision liability had been discussed in North
Dakota cases, the issue of a school’s liability had not been addressed, with
the exception of one concurring opinion in Olson v. Bismarck Parks and
Recreation District.62
1.

North Dakota’s Interpretation of Recreational Use Immunity
Prior to the 1995 Amendments

The first recreational use immunity case before the North Dakota
Supreme Court was Stokka.63 However, the first case to question political
subdivision liability in relation to recreational use immunity was Fastow.64
57. See Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the House Agric. Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. (N.D.
1995) [hereinafter House Hearing] (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land Comm’r,
dated Feb. 22, 1995).
58. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 8, 642 N.W.2d 864, 867
(citing 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 503, § 1) (emphasis added).
59. Id. (citing 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 162, § 7).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01 (2007) (emphasis added).
61. See Olson, ¶ 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867; see also Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the Senate
Agric. Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 1995) (testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land
Comm’r).
62. See Olson, ¶ 22, 642 N.W.2d at 872 (Neumann, J., concurring).
63. See supra Part II.B.1.
64. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Despite the Fastow court’s discussion that chapter 53-08 relating to
immunity precludes subsection 32-12.1-03(1) liability for ordinary negligence of a political subdivision,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court held, in
Hovland, the original recreational use immunity statutes only insulated
private landowners from liability in light of the abolition of governmental
immunity.66 The change in the court’s interpretation sparked the legislature’s willingness to broaden the recreational use immunity statutes and
allowed, once again, for some form of political subdivision immunity with
the inclusion of “public lands” in the recreational use statutes.67
2.

North Dakota’s Interpretation Following the
1995 Amendments

In their current form, the broadened recreational use immunity statutes
are constitutionally applicable to political subdivisions.68 This pronouncement occurred in Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation District.69 In
Olson, two sledders injured themselves on property owned by the Parks and
Recreation District, which was a political subdivision.70 After determining
the legislature had altered the recreational use immunity statutes to include
public landowners, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the statutes
applied to preclude any suit for ordinary negligence against the political
subdivision.71 Because the activity of sledding was clearly recreational, the
statutes’ purpose was fulfilled by limiting tort liability for opening land
without charge for recreational use.72
Even with considerable legislative changes to recreational use immunity statutes, more cases questioned the extent of the new definitions. For
instance, in Leet v. City of Minot,73 Leet was injured while working at a
municipal auditorium for a vendor that was participating in an educational
and entertainment event.74 Although the legislature’s intent in changing the
definition of “recreational purposes” was to cover all recreational

65. See Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D. 1987).
66. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶¶ 10-11, 563 N.W.2d 384, 387.
67. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995); see also Hovland, ¶ 16 n.5, 563 N.W.2d at 388 (“Since Fastow,
the legislature has amended the recreational use statute to include all public lands, as well as
private land.”).
68. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 17, 642 N.W.2d 864, 871.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 2, 642 N.W.2d at 865.
71. Id. ¶ 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871.
72. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 642 N.W.2d at 870-71.
73. 2006 ND 191, 721 N.W.2d 398.
74. Leet, ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 401.
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activities,75 the court noted consideration must be given to the location and
nature of the person’s conduct when the person was injured.76 Thus,
“recreational purposes” could not logically include all activities, and Leet’s
purpose at the site for employment could not be considered “recreational.”77
The factors from Leet were also considered in Kappenman v. Klipfel78
as the primary analysis in determining whether to apply the recreational use
immunity statutes. In Kappenman, a thirteen-year-old boy was killed while
driving an all-terrain vehicle when it dropped into a washout on land owned
by Klipfel.79 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted the term “roads” was
included within the definition of “land” for purposes of recreational use
immunity, but the court stated the legislature could not have intended all
roads open for both travel and recreation to be included within the definition.80 Because North Dakota cases prior to Kappenman held a location
must be open for a recreational purpose in order to apply chapter 53-08, and
because the section line was held out for purposes of non-recreation and
recreation, the recreational use immunity statutes did not apply.81
The latest case to address recreational purpose under chapter 53-08 was
Schmidt v. Gateway Community Fellowship.82 In that case, Schmidt, a
pedestrian, stepped into a hole at a mall parking lot while attending an event
sponsored by Gateway Community Fellowship, a local church.83 The purpose of the event was recreational, but there was also a commercial aspect
by soliciting vendors and charging a registration fee for contests.84 As a
result of the “mixed use” of recreational and commercial use, the North
Dakota Supreme Court announced that a balancing test of all the social and
economic aspects of the activity and a totality of the circumstances standard
was necessary to determine whether chapter 53-08 applied.85 In order to
properly consider all the factors surrounding the activity, including, but not
limited to, the user’s subjective purpose, the issue of whether recreational
use immunity applied was remanded to the trier of fact to decide.86
75. Id. ¶ 17, 721 N.W.2d at 405 (quoting House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of
Robert Olheiser, State Land Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995)).
76. Id. ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d at 406.
77. See id. ¶ 21.
78. 2009 ND 89, 765 N.W.2d 716.
79. Kappenman, ¶¶ 2, 4, 765 N.W.2d at 718-19.
80. Id. ¶ 23, 765 N.W.2d at 725.
81. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 765 N.W.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
82. 2010 ND 69, 781 N.W.2d 200.
83. Schmidt, ¶ 2, 781 N.W.2d at 202.
84. Id. ¶ 3.
85. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22-23, 781 N.W.2d at 207-08.
86. Id. ¶ 24, 781 N.W.2d at 209. The balancing test adopted by the court was not clearly
stated in Schmidt, but it alluded to consideration of many factors such as “the nature of the
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Foreshadowing of School Applicability

Justice Neumann’s concurring opinion in Olson indicated his dismay
about the wording of other definitions in the recreational use immunity statutes in the context of student injuries occurring on school grounds.87 Specifically, he stated his concern was the word “education” included in the
definition of “recreational purposes.”88 According to Justice Neumann,
“The statute appears to relieve all school districts of any duty to keep their
buildings and other premises safe for use by students who have not paid a
fee for the educational use of those premises.”89 As explained below,
Justice Neumann’s concern was addressed, and arguably definitively
answered, in M.M.
III. ANALYSIS
In order to reach its result in M.M., regarding which standard of
negligence for which the District was bound, the North Dakota Supreme
Court separated its analysis into three different parts. First, the court
examined the applicable North Dakota law governing liability for injuries.90
Second, the court stated the current analysis for recreational use immunity
and addressed whether the recreational use immunity statutes were applicable considering the duties of schools toward students.91 Third, the court
compared the case to other jurisdictions that reached similar outcomes.92
A. CONTROLLING NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Under the North Dakota Century Code, political subdivisions may be
liable under recreational use immunity statutes if certain circumstances
exist.93 However, the North Dakota Century Code also provides an exception to liability with the recreational use immunity statutes.94 In an attempt
to “harmonize statutes to avoid conflicts between them,” the court analyzed
each statute to determine whether recreational use immunity applied and,

property, the nature of the owner’s activity, and the reason the injured person is on the property.”
Id. ¶ 22, 781 N.W.2d at 208 (citations omitted). Additional focus may be whether there was
emphasis on free recreational use or whether there were more commercial aspects to the activity.
Id. ¶ 21.
87. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 22, 642 N.W.2d 864, 872.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶¶ 9-10, 783 N.W.2d 806, 810-11.
91. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 783 N.W.2d at 812-13.
92. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15.
93. Id. ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (2010)).
94. Id. ¶ 10, 783 N.W.2d at 811.
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ultimately, what standard of negligence applied to the District for injuries
that occurred on the District’s property.95
1.

Political Subdivision Liability—General Negligence Standard

As the court in M.M. noted, North Dakota follows a general negligence
standard for premises liability.96 That is, a landowner’s duty of care to
those on his property is to “exercise reasonable care to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of injury, and the
burden of avoiding the risk.”97 While this principle applies to all lawful
entrants on the property, it does not extend to trespassers.98 Instead, a landowner must only not harm a trespasser in a willful manner.99
This standard applies to political subdivisions when certain circumstances exist, as codified in section 32-12.1-03(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code.100 By virtue of the definition provided for “political subdivision,” this statute extends to school districts.101 Not only can a political
subdivision be liable for injuries caused by a condition or use of property to
the same extent that a private person could be liable for the injury, but a
political subdivision can also be held liable for injuries “caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of an employee acting within the scope
of the employee’s employment.”102 Thus, the court concluded a school
district could potentially face liability on two separate and independent
grounds.103
2.

Recreational Use Immunity Statutes—Willful and Malicious
Conduct Standard

An exception to political subdivision liability is the recreational use
immunity statutes, if the statutes apply.104 Under these statutes, the landowner’s duty of care may change from the general negligence standard to

95. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting In re Midgett, 2007 ND 198, ¶ 12, 742 N.W.2d 803, 806).
96. Id. ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810.
97. Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d 200, 203.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810.
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-02(6)(a) (2010) (defining “political subdivision” to include
“all . . . school districts . . . which are created either by statute or by the Constitution of North
Dakota for local government or other public purposes”).
102. M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810-11 (quoting Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist.,
415 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D. 1982)); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1).
103. See M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810.
104. Id. ¶ 10, 783 N.W.2d at 811.
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no duty of care if the landowner opens his property for recreational purposes.105 Once the land is open for recreational purposes without charge,
the owner owes no duty to keep the premises safe or to warn against any
danger present, absent any willful and malicious failure to do so.106
In M.M., the lower court determined the District’s property fell within
the definition of “land” and that the activity in which M.M. participated was
educational within the definition of “recreational purpose.”107 In deciding
that the District and activity semantically fit within the recreational use
immunity statutes, the standard applied was whether the District, or Hart as
an employee of the District, acted willfully and maliciously in failing to
protect M.M.108 Because the district court determined the conduct did not
reach the higher “willful and malicious” standard, the District was found to
be immune.109
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s
analysis on the applied standard because the recreational use immunity
statutes must be read in conjunction with political subdivision liability.110
Without harmonization of the statutes, the legislature’s intent may be disregarded and the statutes may be construed to have an “absurd or ludicrous”
result.111 Thus, the question before the court was whether, in light of
political subdivision liability and other duties owed to students, the recreational use immunity statutes should apply, granting no duty to the school
district, absent a “willful and malicious” standard.112
B. APPLICATION OF THE RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
AND THE ROLES OF STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS
The appropriate analysis for recreational use immunity applicability
has been set forth in recent North Dakota Supreme Court cases.113 Despite
this authority, the court also considered the legislative intent behind the
recreational use statutes and the statutory duties imposed on schools by the

105. Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-02.
106. Id. §§ 53-08-02, -05(1).
107. M.M., ¶ 11, 783 N.W.2d at 811.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 12, 783 N.W.2d at 811-12.
111. Id. at 812.
112. See id. ¶¶ 12, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 811, 815.
113. See Kappenman v. Klipfel, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20, 765 N.W.2d 716, 723 (quoting Leet v.
City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d 398) (stating “the proper analysis in deciding
whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location
and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs”).

2010]

CASE COMMENT

703

legislature to determine whether the true purpose of immunity was served
by its application in M.M.114
1.

Recreational Use Immunity Analysis

The court, in M.M., utilized the analysis articulated in Kappenman as
the “proper analysis” to determine recreational use immunity.115 As M.M.
presumably had no mixed recreational and non-recreational or commercial
use, the recent Schmidt decision and its additional considerations were inapplicable.116 In other words, consideration must have been given to the location of the accident as well as the injured person’s conduct at the time of the
accident.117 While the location of the accident in Kappenman technically
fell within the definition of “land” for purposes of the recreational use
statutes, the court stated the legislature could not have intended a broad
interpretation of roads to include the section line used for travel and recreation.118 Thus, the location consideration in Kappenman was determinative
in holding against applying the immunity.119
Similarly, the court, in M.M., analyzed the definition and intent to interpret “recreational purpose,” but with lesser weight than in Kappenman.120
While the term includes education, the statutes in North Dakota “do not
‘encourage’ schools to open their doors to students for the ‘recreational
purposes’ of ‘education.’”121 The intent of the statutes, the court noted, was
“to encourage landowners to open their land for recreational purposes by
giving them immunity from suit under certain circumstances.”122 Although
the court acknowledged the traditional recreational use immunity analysis
by stating the location of the injury was on school grounds and during
school hours, the court’s main concern was, instead, whether these facts,
along with the school’s other duties of care, warranted the statutes’
application.123

114. See M.M., ¶¶ 14-15, 783 N.W.2d at 812-13.
115. Id. ¶ 13, 783 N.W.2d at 812.
116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
117. M.M., ¶ 13, 783 N.W.2d at 812.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. ¶ 14.
121. Id. at 813 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(4) (2009)).
122. Id. ¶ 14, 783 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND
69, ¶ 10, 781 N.W.2d 200, 204).
123. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815-16.
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School Duties of Care

After utilizing the analysis for the recreational use immunity statutes,
the court focused its attention on several statutes that address the role of
schools in North Dakota.124 These statutes include, among other things,
requirements for health, safety, sanitation, testing, curriculum, and attendance.125 The court also noted it previously recognized a special relationship between schools and students, thereby applying particular duty
standards.126 Generally, the duty owed to students by schools is one of “ordinary care.”127 The exercise of ordinary care in keeping the premises and
facilities safe extends not only to students, but also to minors who may
foreseeably be injured.128 Despite the standard being “ordinary care,” this
standard is actually specified as “such care . . . as a parent of ordinary
prudence would observe” and “greater than [the duty] owed an adult,” due
to the age and immaturity of a child.129
In considering the purpose of the recreational use immunity statutes,
along with the established school duties, the court determined the two concepts clashed.130 To allow immunity would rule out these duties.131 This
stance—that recreational use immunity statutes were not intended to relieve
school duties of care—has been mirrored by other jurisdictions as the
predominant view.132
C. OTHER STATE DECISIONS
Other jurisdictions’ rulings influenced the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s reconciliation of the recreational use statutes.133 Because the issue
in M.M. had never been raised in North Dakota, other state cases involving
the applicability of recreational use immunity statutes to student injuries on
school grounds solidified the court’s decision to follow the majority viewpoint.134 In particular, the court relied heavily on the similar, but not

124. See id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813; see also N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 15.1.
125. M.M., ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 15.1-06, -20).
126. Id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813.
127. Id.; see also Besette v. Enderlin Sch. Dist. No. 22, 310 N.W.2d 759, 763 (N.D. 1981).
128. M.M., ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (citing Besette, 310 N.W.2d at 763).
129. Id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813.
130. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815.
131. Id.
132. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15.
133. See id.
134. Cf. id. ¶ 16, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (“Numerous courts have refused to apply recreational
use immunity statutes to bar suits against school districts brought by students injured on school
grounds during the school day.”).
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identical, fact pattern and analysis in Bauer v. Minidoka School District No.
331,135 an Idaho Supreme Court decision.136
In Bauer, a student tripped over a sprinkler and injured himself while
playing on his school’s football field shortly before classes began for the
day.137 The trial court found recreational use immunity statutes shielded the
school district from liability.138 On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
disagreed and determined while the student was engaging in a recreational
activity, he was not the type of recreational user contemplated by the
recreational use statutes.139 Rather, there was a special relationship
between the school district and students that would be compromised by
enabling immunity when a student is legitimately on school grounds.140
Other state courts from Nebraska, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Rhode
Island, and Washington have declared similar outcomes from cases involving school district liability.141 In all the cases cited by the court in M.M.,
the recreational use immunity statutes served the same purpose of creating
no duty to recreational users who were not charged to be on the property for
recreational purposes.142 However, using the same process of statutory
interpretation the North Dakota Supreme Court utilized, the cases held no
immunity should be granted to the schools.143

135. 778 P.2d 336 (Idaho 1989).
136. M.M., ¶ 16, 783 N.W.2d at 813.
137. Bauer, 778 P.2d at 337.
138. Id. Just as in North Dakota, the recreational use immunity statutes in Idaho are in place
“to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge
for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such
purposes.” Id. at 337-38.
139. Id. at 339.
140. Id. at 338-39.
141. M.M., ¶ 17, 783 N.W.2d at 814.
142. See Alter v. City of Newton, 617 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); McIntosh v.
Omaha Pub. Schs., 544 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Neb. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Bronsen v.
Dawes Cnty., 722 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Neb. 2006); Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 725
(R.I. 2006); Home v. North Kitsap Sch. Dist., 965 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998);
Auman v. Sch. Dist. of Stanley-Boyd, 635 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Wis. 2001).
143. Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661 (although the student’s injury occurred after track practice, she
was legitimately on the premises as a student; thus, the school owed her a duty of care); McIntosh,
544 N.W.2d at 508 (a student who was part of an athletic clinic program was not barred from
bringing suit for his injury because the field was not open to members of the public as contemplated by the state’s recreational liability statute); Morales, 895 A.2d at 730-31 (a student athlete
injured during a soccer game was owed a special duty and was not the type of recreational user
contemplated by the recreational use immunity statutes); Home, 965 P.2d at 1117 (because the
football game where the football coach was injured was not open for members of the public as the
recreational use immunity statutes suggested, North Kitsap was not immune under the recreational
use statute); Auman, 635 N.W.2d at 768 (a student’s injury during recess was a non-recreational
activity under the state’s recreational use immunity statutes because the student’s attendance was
mandatory under state law). But see Lanning v. Anderson, 921 P.2d 813, 820 (Kan. Ct. App.
1996) (a student injured during track practice was barred from bringing suit against the school
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IV. IMPACT
The decision of M.M. will undoubtedly affect future school liability
with regard to students recreationally on school grounds during school
hours.144 What was left unexplained by the court, however, was the issue of
trespass on school grounds.145 Furthermore, judicial narrowing of the application of the recreational use immunity statutes may have subverted the
legislative intent behind the 1995 amendments by increasing future
liability.146
A. ISSUE OF TRESPASS UNRESOLVED
The opinion in M.M. follows an assumption that M.M. was legitimately
on school grounds in his capacity as a student despite the questionable use
of the premises, the ambiguous permission provided to the students, and the
time at which the accident occurred.147 Because the court relied upon this
assumption in determining the outcome, the issue of trespass was not
discussed.148 In fact, the court mentioned in dicta, M.M. “snuck into the
auditorium,” but dismissed the allegation as a possible defense to address
on remand.149 Some cases from other jurisdictions cited by the North
Dakota Supreme Court, however, potentially allude to the use of recreational use immunity statutes in a case of trespass on school grounds.150
In Alter v. City of Newton,151 one case cited by the court in M.M., the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts emphasized the student’s presence at the
school, while slightly past school hours for track practice, was legitimate
for purposes of her status as a student.152 Because her use of the premises
was legitimate at the time of her injury, the special relationship between the
school and student remained to impose a duty of care and no recreational

because the Kansas Tort Claims Act applied to school-sponsored activities as well as playground
areas).
144. M.M., ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 816 (stating a school district cannot use recreational use
immunity statutes to escape liability from certain student injuries).
145. See id.
146. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995).
147. See M.M., ¶¶ 3-5, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 809, 815-16.
148. See generally id. Trespass in North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statutes is only
mentioned in section 53-08-04, with reference to leased lands to the state or to political
subdivisions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-04 (2007) (“The provisions of this section apply whether
the person entering upon the leased land is an invitee, licensee, trespasser, or otherwise.”)
(emphasis added).
149. M.M., ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 816.
150. See Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661; Morales, 895 A.2d at 732.
151. 617 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
152. Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661.
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use immunity.153 While still unclear from the court’s holding, lack of permission for the student to be on the premises may have been grounds for
relieving the school of its duty of care.
In a similar case cited by the M.M. court, Morales v. Town of
Johnston,154 a student was injured while playing an organized, schoolsponsored soccer game, which made the student a permitted user of the
field at that time.155 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the
recreational use immunity statutes could not be applied in that situation
because there was a special duty to the student.156 Yet, the court also mentioned, “[I]f [the] plaintiff had come to the . . . soccer field to play a soccer
game that was not organized or sanctioned by the school district, [the town
of] Johnston may have been immune under the recreational use statute.”157
Because these cases were presented with facts absent evidence of trespassing, it is unclear how the rulings would have changed if the students
had trespassed. Based on North Dakota precedent, however, if an individual trespasses, as opposed to legitimately uses school premises during
school hours, recreational use immunity may apply should the individual
have a “recreational purpose.”158 In the end, the trespass and recreational
use immunity statute standard of care would be the same: no duty except
for willful and malicious acts.159
While the issue remains whether an individual, who may be a student,
engages in recreational activities after school hours on school grounds
would be able to bring a personal injury suit in light of the recreational use
immunity statutes, such was not the case from the facts stated in M.M.
153. Id.
154. 895 A.2d 721 (R.I. 2006).
155. Morales, 895 A.2d at 731.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 732 n.11.
158. See, e.g., Cudworth v. Midcontinent Commc’ns, 380 F.3d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 2004)
(noting regardless of invitee, licensee, or trespassee status, recreational use immunity statutes
apply to property used for public, recreational use).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05 (2007) (providing a recreational use immunity statute
exception for failure to warn against dangerous conditions); Cudworth, 380 F.3d at 379 n.4
(“North Dakota has abolished the common law distinction between licensee and invitee and the
elaborate permutations of each, but still recognizes that lesser duties are owed to trespassers.”);
see also 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 236 (2010) (“An
exception to a municipality’s statutory recreational use immunity is that a municipality owes the
same duty to recreational users of its facilities that a private person owes to trespassers.”).
Compare Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d 200, 203 (citing
O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 748-52 (N.D. 1977)) (stating the standard for trespassers
has been retained in North Dakota that no duty is owed to them, but a landowner must not harm a
trespasser in a willful and wanton manner), with Prokon v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 754 N.W.2d
709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 466.03(6)(e)) (noting “[r]ecreational-use
immunity is subject to the exception that it does not provide immunity ‘for conduct that would
entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person’”).
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Therefore, following North Dakota precedent and statutes, the outcome of
M.M. was congruent with these principles.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT COMPROMISED
With the passage of the recreational use immunity statutes, the legislature has acted toward reducing liability of landowners in certain circumstances and has reacted toward extending these statutes when faced with
judicial pronouncements. An interesting juxtaposition has resulted over the
years that pit the legislature’s efforts of expanding recreational use
immunity against the judiciary’s narrower interpretation of the terms within
the statutes.160 Fundamentally, by limiting the bounds of recreational use
immunity, more liability—which was sought to be reduced by amending the
statutes in 1995—could result from the M.M. decision.161
Yet, despite the court’s prior admonishment of creating public policy
by judicially expanding liability in Stokka,162 the court’s decision in M.M.
was more in line with current, established school duties of care to students
rather than mere legislative intent.163 If the decision in M.M. is, in fact,
contrary to the legislature’s intent for recreational use immunity statutes,
the next course of action for the legislature may be the familiar amendment
process to change or adapt the statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
In M.M., the North Dakota Supreme Court held a school district may
not seek shelter under the recreational use immunity statutes when a student
was injured on school grounds during school hours.164 In the forty-five year
history of the recreational use immunity statutes, the statutes have faced
judicial scrutiny in relation to political subdivisions,165 have been developed
through the use of specific analysis,166 and have undergone legislative
160. See, e.g., Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 27, 721 N.W.2d 398, 407 (Crothers, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Legislature has never retreated from [the goal of opening property to the
public for recreational use] by narrowing the scope of the recreational use immunity statutes.”).
161. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995) (“With the loss of sovereign immunity through the recent North
Dakota Supreme Court decision, we have been carefully considering the exposure of the Board of
University and School Lands relative to the land that it administers.”).
162. Stokka v. Cass Cnty. Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 914 (N.D. 1985).
163. See generally M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, 783 N.W.2d 806.
164. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815.
165. See generally Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384 (stating
original recreational use immunity statutes in North Dakota only encompassed private, and not
public, lands).
166. See Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d 398, 406 (“The proper
analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include
consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.”).
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amendments.167 Despite this long history, the result in M.M. was driven by
a harmonization of political subdivision liability with recreational use
immunity, ultimately leading to the conclusion that a school’s duty to
students precludes immunity under chapter 53-08 in these circumstances.168
Rather than hinging on legislative history or the plain meaning of the
statutes, the M.M. decision holistically considered the specific facts of the
case, the recreational use immunity statutes’ purpose, and established duties
of care. Although the decision may be contrary to legislative intent, it falls
in line with the prevailing view of other jurisdictions.169
Vanessa Anderson*

167. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995); see also Hovland, ¶ 16 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d at 388 (“Since Fastow,
the legislature has amended the recreational use statute to include all public lands, as well as
private lands.”).
168. M.M., ¶¶ 12, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 811-12, 815.
169. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15.
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